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Abstract—Modern networks are becoming increasingly in-
terdependent. As a prominent example, the smart grid is an
electrical grid controlled through a communications network,
which in turn is powered by the electrical grid. Such interde-
pendencies create new vulnerabilities and make these networks
more susceptible to failures. In particular, failures can easily
spread across these networks due to their interdependencies,
possibly causing cascade effects with a devastating impact on
their functionalities.
In this paper we focus on the interdependence between the
power grid and the communications network, and propose
a novel realistic model, HINT (Heterogeneous Interdependent
NeTworks), to study the evolution of cascading failures. Our
model takes into account the heterogeneity of such networks
as well as their complex interdependencies. We compare HINT
with previously proposed models both on synthetic and real
network topologies. Experimental results show that existing
models oversimplify the failure evolution and network function-
ality requirements, resulting in severe underestimations of the
cascading failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern networks, such as the smart grid and communi-
cations networks, are becoming increasingly interdependent
[1]–[8]. As an example, the smart grid is an electrical grid
monitored and controlled by one or more control centers
[9] through a communications network. These control cen-
ters remotely interact with smart devices, such as: smart
meters, Automatic Generation Controls (AGCs) and Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs), which directly operate on the
elements of the grid. For instance, AGCs control power plants
for energy generation, while PMUs monitor transmission and
distribution substations. In turn, such smart devices, and the
communications network itself, are powered by the electrical
grid, thus generating complex potential feedback loops.
These complex interdependencies may severely affect net-
work functionalities. In particular, a few initial failures may
easily spread across the networks due to such interdepen-
dencies, possibly causing cascade effects with a devastating
impact. A well-known example of such effects occurred in
Italy in 2003 [6], [10]. An initial failure in the power network
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caused the failure of several nodes in the communications
network, which generated a cascading effect that left half of
the country with no electricity for several hours. A similar
event affected the Northeastern and Midwestern United States,
and the Canadian province of Ontario, in 2003 [11]. These
events are not uncommon, as between 2003 and 2012, more
than 600 regional outages occurred in the USA, which affected
millions of people [12]. While little information is available
about the nature of these events (i.e., being accidental or
maliciously originated), we believe that interdependencies
between the smart grid and communications networks should
be particularly protected from malicious exploitation.
For the above reasons it is of fundamental importance to
study and understand the evolution of failures in interde-
pendent networks. Previous works mainly considered high
level abstractions that allow to formulate elegant mathemat-
ical frameworks, generally based on percolation theory [13].
Unfortunately, these approaches overlook several features of
these systems, and assume homogeneity of network elements,
unrealistic failure propagation conditions and even unrealistic
topological constraints [1], [2], [4], [5], [7], [8]. As a result,
these approaches, although mathematically elegant, cannot
accurately predict the dynamics of failure evolution in real
networks.
In this paper we propose a realistic model, HINT (Hetero-
geneous Interdependent NeTwork), to study the evolution of
cascading failures in interdependent networks. In particular,
we focus on the power grid, the communications network, and
their interdependencies. Unlike previous works, we address the
heterogeneity of the structure of the power grid by considering
its nodes to be functionally separated in three categories:
generation, transmission and distribution. Similarly, we differ-
entiate nodes in the communications network, identifying the
control centers that remotely operate the power grid, and the
relay nodes which are only responsible for data communica-
tion. We define a set of logical and physical interdependencies
as well as a set of conditions to determine the evolution of
failures across networks.
We further compare our model, HINT, with two previously
proposed approaches, using realistic synthetic topologies, as
well as real topologies from the Minnesota Power grid [14]
and communications network [15]. Our experimental results
show that existing approaches largely underestimate the effects
of cascading failures, due to their simplifying assumptions.
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On the contrary, our model is able to capture the complex
functionalities and interactions of these systems and represents
an important step towards an accurate model of cascading
failures in interdependent networks.
In summary, the major contributions of this paper are:
• We propose HINT, a realistic model for failure prop-
agation in interdependent power and communications
networks, which takes into account their heterogeneity,
as well as their logical and physical interdependencies.
• We define a set of conditions governing the evolution
of failures that account for network heterogeneity and
complex interdependencies.
• We compare HINT with previous models on synthetic
and real networks. Results show that our model better
predicts the evolution of cascading failures.
II. EXISTING MODELS FOR FAILURE PROPAGATION
Several models have been proposed to study the spreading
of failures in interdependent networks [10], [16]–[18]. Most
of these works focus on the power grid and the communi-
cations network, and share a common framework according
to which both networks can be represented as undirected
graphs. In particular, the power grid is modeled as a graph
Gpow = (Vpow, Epow), while the communications network
as a graph Gcom = (Vcom, Ecom). Dependencies between
nodes in the different networks are represented as a set
Edep of edges between nodes in the two graphs. Due to the
dependencies defined by the set Edep, a node failure in one
network may cause the failure of other nodes within the same
network, as well as on the other network. Existing models for
failure propagation differ in how they assign interdependencies
between networks and in how they define the conditions that
a node must meet in order to be considered operational.
In the following, we describe two existing models that we
use for comparison with the realistic model proposed in this
paper. The first model has been one of the first proposed in
this context, in the pioneering work of Buldyrev et al. [10].
We refer to this model as the Uniform model. It is a relatively
simple model, based on several simplifying assumptions. In
contrast, the second model has been recently proposed [18],
and addresses more general scenarios and more complex
failure propagation conditions. We refer to this model as
the Small Clusters model. Figure 1 summarizes the notations
adopted for nodes and links.
A. Uniform model
The Uniform model [10] assumes that all nodes, in both
the power and communications networks, are homogeneous
in terms of their roles in the network and in the failure
propagation process. Because of this uniform behavior, we
refer to this model as the Uniform model.
Interdependencies: This model assumes the so called one-to-
one dependency, that is, a node u in a network depends on
exactly one node v in the other network, and, vice-versa, v
depends only on u. To represent this, we consider the edges
in Edep to be undirected, and the inter-degree of each node to
be exactly one. Figure 4a shows the structure of the Uniform
model. The roles of the represented nodes have no influence
on this model.
Both assumptions mentioned above considerably simplify
the structure of real networks and their interdependencies.
In fact, real networks are highly heterogeneous, and their
interdependencies can be multiple, directed and asymmetrical.
Failure propagation: According to the Uniform model, a
node u is considered operational if it belongs to the giant
component of its network and if the node v on which it
depends, i.e., (u, v) ∈ Edep is also operational.
Let GC(Gpow) and GC(Gcom) be the set of currently
operational nodes in the giant component of the power and
communications network, respectively. Let us consider a node
u ∈ Vpow in the power network. This node fails if (i) u /∈
GC(Gpow) (intra-network failure), and (ii) @(u, v) ∈ Edep s.t.
v ∈ GC(Gcom) (inter-network failure). Similar conditions can
be easily defined for nodes in the communications network.
Given the above failure propagation conditions, we provide
in Algorithm Simulation the scheme used to determine the
failure propagation. We denote by F 0 the initial set of failed
nodes at time t = 0, and we assume for simplicity that
nodes initially fail in the power network1, i.e., we assume
F 0 ⊆ Vpow. Additionally, we denote by F tpow and V tpow
the set of nodes that at round t are failed and operational,
respectively. We use a similar notation, F tcom and V
t
com, for
the communications network.
Given the initial failed nodes, the failure conditions are
checked in phases. In the first phase (lines 6-7), the algorithm
checks the new intra-network failures in the power network,
i.e., if there are nodes that no more belong to the giant
component. In the second phase (lines 8-9), it checks if there
are some additional inter-network failures, i.e., if some power
nodes depend on failed communications nodes, and hence
they also fail. The last two phases (lines 10-13) perform
similar checks for nodes on the communications network. The
algorithm iterates until the cascading failure effects converge
and no more failures occur.
B. Small clusters model
The Small Clusters (SC) model [18] is more advanced and
takes into account different roles of nodes in the commu-
nications network, more complex network interdependencies
and failure propagation schemes. In particular, this model
introduces two types of nodes in the communications network,
control nodes and relay nodes. Control nodes are responsible
for controlling the functionality of the nodes in the power grid,
while relay nodes provide the communications infrastructure
of the communications network. We refer to the set of control
nodes as Vcc, and to the set of relay nodes as Vrl. Therefore,
Vcom = Vcc ∪ Vrl. Figure 3a shows the structure of the SC
model. Only the roles of nodes in the communications network
are considered.
1A similar approach can be used to consider nodes initially failed in the
communications network, or in both networks.
Algorithm 1: Simulation
Input: Gpow(Vpow, Epow) power grid
Gcom(Vcom, Ecom) communications network
F 0 ⊆ Vpow initial set of failures
Output: Graphs at steady state, after cascading failures
// initialization
1 t← 0;
2 V tpow ← V t−1pow \ F 0;
3 V tcom ← Vcom;
4 while additional failures are possible do
5 t← t+ 1;
// Intra-network failures for Gpow
6 F tpow = nodes in V t−1pow not in GCt(Gpow);
7 V tpow ← V t−1pow \ F tpow;
// Inter-network failures for Gpow
8 F tpow = nodes in V tpow with no support in Gcom;
9 V tpow ← V tpow \ F tpow;
// Intra-network failures for Gcom
10 F tcom = nodes in V t−1com not in to GCt(Gcom);
11 V tcom ← V t−1com \ F tcom;
// Inter-network failures for Gcom
12 F tcom = nodes in V tcom with no support in Gpow;
13 V tcom ← V tcom \ F tcom;
Interdependencies: The model adopts an interdependency
structure known as the k-n dependency, initially proposed in
[17]. According to this model each node in Gpow depends
on k control nodes in Gcom, while every control node in
Gcom supports n nodes in Gpow. Additionally, every node in
Gcom depends on one power node in Gpow for power supply.
Dependencies are directional and asymmetric, so if a node u
depends on a node v, it does not imply that v depends on u.
Since dependencies are directional (arcs instead of edges),
two different sets of dependency arcs are introduced, Actrl ⊆
Vpow × Vcom and Aenergy ⊆ Vcom × Vpow, where × is the
Cartesian product operation. An arc (u, v) ∈ Actrl means that
the power node u is controlled by the control center v. Sim-
ilarly, an arc (u, v) ∈ Aenergy means that a communications
node u is powered by a node v of the power network.
Failure propagation: The SC model is based on the obser-
vation that the giant component, as a criteria to determine if
a node is functional, is not representative of the operation of
real systems. The authors point out in [18] that sufficiently
large components can also be operational, although discon-
nected from the giant component. For this reason, the model
introduces a threshold ∆ on the size of a component, above
which the nodes are considered to be able to operate. In
addition, such nodes also need to have at least an interlink
to the other network. As a result, some autonomous clusters
can keep operating although they become disconnected from
the giant component.
In the SC model, the propagation of failures across networks
is determined using a scheme similar to the Uniform model.
We do not provide the pseudo-code due to space limitations.
However, it can be easily obtained from Algorithm Simulation
by substituting the failure conditions of the Uniform model
with those of the SC model.
The SC model significantly improves previous approaches,
however it still overlooks several important aspects of real
systems. In particular, all nodes in the power networks are
considered homogeneous, while in real power system we
observe nodes which produce energy, transfer energy, and
distribute energy. In addition, the size of a component alone
is not sufficient to determine its capability to operate. For
instance, a group of substations will not be able to distribute
any energy if it is not connected to any power plant. Finally,
the SC model only considers logical dependencies of power
nodes with the control center. It does not consider that such
control can only be realized if the power nodes can access the
communications network through a relay node to communicate
with their control center. In the next section we introduce our
realistic failure propagation model, which takes into account
these aspects of real systems.
III. A REALISTIC MODEL FOR FAILURE PROPAGATION
In this section we introduce HINT, our proposed model
for realistic failure propagation in interdependent power and
communications networks. Unlike the Uniform and SC mod-
els, HINT specifically addresses the heterogeneity of the
structure of both networks, and differentiates between logical
and physical interdependencies. Based on these features, we
define a set of conditions to determine the spreading of intra-
and inter-network failures.
Network heterogeneity: We consider nodes in the power
grid Gpow to be functionally separated in three categories2:
generation nodes Vgen, transmission nodes Vts, and distri-
bution nodes Vds. Generation nodes, such as power plants,
produce electricity. Transmission nodes connect power lines
and are used for switching current. Finally, distribution nodes
are substations containing transformers that step down the
voltage and distribute electricity to the final users.
Similarly, we differentiate nodes in the communications
network Gcom considering control centers Vcc, that remotely
operate the power grid, and relay nodes Vrl which are only
responsible for data communication. Figure 2a shows the
structure of HINT, the notation is explained in Figure 1. The
roles of all the represented nodes are taken into account by
our model.
Interdependencies: HINT specifically considers logical and
physical interdependencies between the power and the com-
munications network. Physical dependencies occur between
the nodes in the communications network and nodes in the
power network. In particular, a node in the communications
network has a physical dependency with the nodes in the
power network from which it receives power. Differently from
previous works, we impose that only distribution nodes can
provide power to the communications nodes, as is the case in
real systems. We represent such dependencies with the set of
directional inter-arcs Aenergy.
2We do not address the customer level of the power grid in this work, since
it has marginal effects on the failure propagation. Nevertheless, the model can
be easily extended to also include such level.
Logical dependencies occur between nodes in the power
network and control centers in the communications network.
These dependencies represent the control that power nodes
need to operate, and are represented by the set of arcs Actrl.
Finally, we introduce a new kind of physical dependencies
between power nodes and communications nodes. In fact,
although a power node is controlled by a control center, this
control is only possible if the power node can access the
communications network. For this reason, in our model each
node in the power network has a physical dependency with
a relay node, which is used to access the communications
network. We represent such dependencies with the set of
directional inter-arcs Ainfo. Note that the dependencies in
Actrl indicate the required logical information-exchange with
the control center, while the dependencies in Ainfo refer to
actual links used to exchange such information.
Failure propagation: The failure propagation scheme in
HINT takes into account the heterogeneity of nodes as well
as the physical and logical dependencies described above. In
the following, we denote by op(u) the fact that node u is
currently operational, and by ¬op(u) otherwise. Additionally,
given two nodes, u and v, in the same network, we introduce
the function path(u, v). This function returns a set of nodes
that are currently operational and constitute a path from u to
v in their network, if it exists, and ∅ otherwise.
We consider a node u in the communications network to fail
only if none of the distribution substations it draws power from
is operative. That is, u fails if ∀v s.t. (u, v) ∈ Ainfo, ¬op(u).
Note that, as in real systems, in our model the functionality
of a node in the communications network does not depend on
the size of the component it belongs to, as long as it receives
power.
According to HINT, a node v in the power grid may fail
for several reasons. Node v fails if all the control centers that
are responsible for its operation have failed, that is ∀u s.t.
(v, u) ∈ Actrl, ¬op(u). Additionally, although some control
centers may be operational after the failure, such control
cannot be performed if v cannot access the communications
network because the relay nodes it uses for this purpose
have failed. For this reason we also introduce the following
condition, v fails if ∀u s.t. (v, u) ∈ Ainfo, ¬op(u).
The access to the communications network is necessary
but not sufficient to ensure the operation of v. In fact, for
a control center to be able to properly control v, there must
be connectivity between the control center and at least a
relay node that v uses to access the communications network.
Formally, v fails if ∀u, q s.t. (v, u) ∈ Ainfo and (v, q) ∈ Actrl,
path(u, q) = ∅.
Finally, a node v in the transmission and distribution net-
work can be operational only if it receives power from a
generator. We model this by allowing v to be functional only if
there exists at least a path in the power network that connects v
to a generator which is currently operational. In other words,
a distribution or transmission node v fails if ∀q ∈ Vgen s.t.
op(q), path(v, q) = ∅.
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF FAILURE PROPAGATION
In this section we present an example to compare the
evolution of cascading failures under the Uniform, SC and
HINT models. Figure 1 summarizes the notations adopted for
nodes and links. Figure 2a shows the considered example.
The scenario includes a power grid with two generators,
two transmission substations, and three distribution nodes.
The communications network, on the other hand, has a single
control center and several relay nodes that enable communi-
cations with the nodes in the power grid. All the nodes in the
power grid have a logical dependency with the control center,
but they also have physical dependencies with relay nodes in
the communications network to realize such control. Finally,
nodes in the communications network also have physical
dependencies on the nodes in the distribution level of the
power grid, from which they receive power supply.
In this example, we consider an attack that disables the
distribution substation D3. According to our model, HINT,
the apparently innocuous failure of D3 has devastating effects.
In particular, the failure of D3 causes the failure of the relay
R6, since D3 provides energy to it. However, R6 is used by
T2 to access the communications network, and hence T2 also
fails. This disconnects the generator G2, leading to several
other cascading effects on both networks and terminating in
the configuration shown in Figure 2b.
We consider the same scenario under the SC model in
Figure 3. We set ∆ = 4. Figure 3a shows the initial con-
figuration. It is important to note that the SC model does not
consider the physical dependencies between power nodes and
the relay nodes used to access the communications network.
As a result, this model does not fully capture the cascade
generated by the failure of D3. In particular, the failure of D3
only causes the failure of R6. No additional failure occurs,
since the dependency of T2 from R6 is not considered by the
model, and the surviving components are larger than ∆. As a
result, the model underestimates the final failures, as shown in
Figure 3b. In this example, any value of ∆ less than 6 leads
to the same final result.
Figure 4 shows the same scenario under the Uniform model.
We recall that this model imposes one-to-one dependencies.
As a result, we cannot include all the actual dependencies.
In order to keep as many as possible, we use a maximum
matching algorithm. First we create a bipartite graph consisting
of power grid nodes, communications network nodes and their
interdependencies. Then we run the algorithm to select the
largest set of edges such that no two edges share a common
vertex. This way, we can keep the maximum number of
dependencies without violating the one-to-one requirement
of the model and obtain the initial configuration shown in
Figure 4a. Several dependencies are necessarily left out, which
reduces the accuracy of the model. In particular, the failure
of D3 only causes the failure of R6, because after these
failures all nodes are still part of the giant component of
their respective networks. Therefore, the Uniform model also
underestimates the final failures, as shown in Figure 4b.
Fig. 1: Graphical notation used for nodes and links in Figures.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Scenario 1, proposed realistic model HINT: (a) initial
configuration, (b) final stable state.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Scenario 1, SC model: (a) initial configuration, (b) final
stable state ∆ = 4.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Scenario 1, Uniform model: (a) initial configuration,
(b) final stable state.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we compare our model, HINT with the
Uniform and SC models through simulation experiments. We
use realistic synthetic network topologies as well as real
network topologies. The simulator we developed to run these
experiments uses the NetworkX library [19], we called it
TiedNets and made it freely available on GitHub [20].
The synthetic power network is created according to the
realistic RT-nested-Smallworld model proposed in [21]. This
model generates a given number of well connected subnet-
works, which are subsequently interconnected. We generated
power networks with 1000 nodes and 20 subnetworks. The
average node degree is 4, which is a typical value for real net-
works such as the United States Northeastern power network
and the European power network [21]. Since the model does
not specify how to classify nodes in the resulting power grid,
we used 100 generators, 270 transmission substations and 630
distribution substations. We assigned such roles so that each
subnet has a similar proportion of nodes in each category.
We generated a synthetic communications network using
the Baraba´si-Albert model [22]. This model is well known to
generate scale-free networks with power-law degree distribu-
tion, and topological structures similar to real communications
networks such as the Internet. In this model, nodes are added
iteratively. Each newly added node connects to m existing
nodes. The probability of connecting to a node is proportional
to its degree. In our experiments we set m = 3. We consider
a special node in the network as a control center, while
the remaining nodes are relay nodes. Also in this case we
generated a network of 1000 nodes.
We interconnect the two synthetic networks as follows. Each
node in the power network has a logical dependency from
the control center and also a physical dependency from a
relay node in the communications network. Each node in the
communications network has a dependency with a node in the
power network from which it receives energy. All physical
dependencies are randomly assigned.
In order to validate HINT and compare it with the Uniform
and SC models, we also use real network topologies. In
particular, we use the Minnesota Power grid [14]. Our data
provides extremely detailed topological information, with all
power lines down to 69 kV and most substations of the State.
We want to highlight that this is the first work that makes
use of such detailed data. The network has 1022 nodes. In
addition, we include generator nodes using the list of power
plants provided in [23] and their positions [24]. Overall, we
identify 69 power plants that include all power plants in the
state with a production higher than or equal to 14 MW. The
total number of nodes in the network is thus 1091.
The real communications network is the fiber optics network
of Minnesota provided by AuroraNet [15]. The network has
681 nodes, to which we attach a node as a control center,
located in the vicinity of the most populated areas.
We interconnect the real networks as follows. All nodes in
the power network have a logical dependency with the control
center. We assign physical dependency using a geographic
criterion. In particular, power nodes depend on the nearest
relay node, while communications nodes depend on the nearest
distribution substation.
In all the following experiments, we average the results of
several runs and show the achieved standard deviation.
A. Random attacks
In the first set of experiments we compare the models under
random attacks. In particular, we initially fail a given number
of nodes selected uniformly at random, and then compare the
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Fig. 5: Random attacks (a) on synthetic networks, and (b) on
real networks.
final number of nodes that have failed under the considered
models after the cascade.
Figure 5a shows the results on synthetic networks. Our
proposed model demonstrates the significant vulnerability of
the considered networks against random attacks. Attacking
as few as 2.5% of the total nodes may cause a complete
outage of both the power and the communications networks.
The heterogeneity of roles in both network, as well as the
complex rules that define the nodes’ ability to operate, unveil
the extreme vulnerability of these networks when coupled
together. These results highlight the importance of considering
network interdependencies when designing future smart grids,
to improve their robustness and reliability.
On the contrary, the other two models significantly under-
estimate the size of the cascade. In particular, for the SC
model we use two settings for the threshold ∆, such as
∆ = 20 and ∆ = 200. The first setting is used in [18],
however, that paper does not provide a methodology to set ∆.
For comparison, we also considered ∆ = 200, that imposes
a significantly larger component size for nodes to correctly
operate. Nevertheless, as Figure 5a shows, both setting behave
similarly. This is due to the high connectivity of both the power
and the communications networks, which prevents network
partitioning due to random attacks [25], and thus prevents
further spreading of failures. The only case of large scale
failures occurs when the control center fails due to the initial
attack. This justifies the large variability of the results shown
by the error bars.
The Uniform model apparently performs better than the SC
model, being able to predict the failure of a higher number
of nodes. However, this is due to the instability of the sys-
tem that results from the one-to-one dependency assignment
requirement by the model. Although we maximize the number
of dependencies thanks to the use of the maximum matching
(discussed in Section IV), a perfect matching may not be
possible, therefore leaving some nodes with no dependency
and unable to operate.
Figure 5b shows the results for the random attacks in
real networks. HINT shows that real networks are more
robust compared to the random networks. This is due to the
geographical assignment of the dependencies, which closely
resembles how nodes are interconnected in reality. In particu-
lar, the geographic assignment tends to localize failures in the
network, making it harder for few initial failures to achieve
a global cascading effect. On the contrary, in the synthetic
networks interdependencies are assigned at random, and a
failure originated in one part of a network can easily spread to
remote parts of the other network. These results highlight the
importance of using real network topologies for studying the
evolution of cascading failures, which may reveal unexpected
effects not captured by synthetic models.
The SC model in this case also underestimates the final
size of the cascade. For these experiments we consider two
setting for the threshold, ∆ = 20 and 200. Although the
two settings behave slightly differently, in both cases the
model underestimates the effects of the failure. Overall, the
inability of the SC model to include physical dependencies and
heterogeneity of the power network, significantly penalizes its
accuracy and causes underestimation of the final size of the
cascade.
Using real network topologies, the Uniform model is crit-
ically unstable, due to the inability of finding a suitable
maximum matching. Because of the cascade of failures caused
by the large number of unsupported nodes, most nodes fail
without being attacked.
B. Targeted attacks
In the second set of experiments, we consider how HINT
reacts to targeted attacks. Several previous works consider
similar attacks [2], [4], generally based on the node degree.
However, these works are based on simplified models similar
to the Uniform model, preventing a fine granularity of the
attack. In our work, we consider targeted attacks which specif-
ically take into account the role of nodes in the network and
their interdependency with the other network. In particular our
attacks focus on the power grid and test four kinds of attacks.
The first attack initially fails distribution nodes in the power
grid, in decreasing order of their inter-degrees (the number of
nodes that depend on them in the other network). The other
three attacks, instead, consider distribution, transmission and
generation nodes, respectively, in decreasing order of their
intra-degree (the number of nodes they are connected to in
their own network).
Figure 6 shows the results of the experiments discussed
above. As the figure points out, attacking distribution sub-
stations according to their inter-degrees is the most effec-
tive in terms of final failures. In fact, these attacks cause
the failure of several relay nodes that depend upon those
distribution substations, therefore limiting the access to the
communications network and triggering further failures that
overall generate devastating effects. The attack on distribution
and transmission substations, based on intra-degrees, has less
effects. Nevertheless, the attack on distribution substations has
more impact due to their role in providing energy to the
communications network. The attack on sole generators has
no particular impact until there is at least one active generator.
We recall that we have 69 generators in the real topologies
that we consider. This shows a limitation of our approach that
only considers connectivity to the generators as a sufficient
condition for a power node to provide sufficient energy to
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Fig. 6: Targeted attacks on real networks.
the communications network. In reality, generators have a
maximum production capacity that cannot be exceeded. We
will consider these aspects in our future works.
VI. RELATED WORKS
The study of failure propagation in interdependent networks
has received considerable attention in recent years [1]–[8],
[26]–[28]. Buldyrev et al. introduced this new research area in
their pioneering work [10]. In our work, we adopt the Uniform
model described in this paper. In particular, an initial failure
is generated by failing a fraction 1 − p of nodes. Additional
failures occur within networks, according to a criteria based
on the giant component, and across network, due to the
interdependencies.
The Uniform model has been extended in numerous ways,
surveyed in [13]. In particular, in [29] nodes are allowed to
have a random number of interdependencies. In [27], [28],
[30] inter-edges are assigned according to an inter-similarity
measure such that nodes with high intra-degrees tend to be
dependent on each other. The authors of [2], [4] consider non-
uniform targeted attacks, while the works in [1], [26], [31],
[32] consider a generalization to the case of n interdependent
networks. Finally, a recent work [18] proposes the small clus-
ters (SC) model discussed in this paper. This model extends
the analysis by considering clusters of nodes above a certain
size as operational.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a realistic model for failure prop-
agation in the interdependent power and communications net-
works. Our model, HINT, considers heterogeneity of network
elements, complex logical and physical interdependencies, as
well as complex failure propagation conditions. We exper-
imentally compare HINT against two existing models. We
adopted synthetic and real networks and considered random
and targeted attacks. Results show that previous approaches
overlooked several critical aspects of the system functionality,
which often result in an underestimation of the failure propaga-
tion process. HINT provides the basis for future development
of formal frameworks to predict the evolution of failures, as
well as to analyze and improve their robustness.
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